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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this study was to analyze the performance of Ethiopia in its exports of coffee and to 
estimate the magnitude and effects of key economic determinants of coffee exports, producer price and 
production. In analyzing the competitiveness of the country in its exports of coffee, three distinct 
periods were considered, namely, years under the imperial regime (1961-73), under the military rule 
(1974-1991) and under the reformist government (1992-2010). The Revealed Comparative Advantage 
(RCA) and Revealed Symmetric Comparative Advantage (RSCA) measures of competitiveness were 
used for the analysis. Even though the results show that Ethiopia has comparative advantage in export 
of coffee, the same cannot be said of its overall performance on the international market owing to 
factors such as challenges with management of price risk, high transaction cost resulting from the 
extensive nature of the supply chain and the numerous actors and processes therein, challenges with 
quality control, low productivity of growers’ fields, and incidence of smuggling. To improve upon its 
export performance and to ensure continuous growth in the major strongholds of the subsector 
(exports, prices and production), based upon estimates for the current study, we propose investment in 
yield-enhancing innovations, devising and implementation of measures to improve quality control in 
the supply chain, address issues with price risk, minimize incidence of smuggling and more 
importantly minimize transaction costs. In addition, measures should be put in place to increase and 
ensure continuous government support to the subsector, hold onto the current devaluation of the 
Ethiopian birr, ensure payment of fair prices to growers and appropriately transmit future increments, 
increase current area under cultivation to enhance efficient utilization of the abundant labour, and to 
attract more export-oriented foreign direct investments (as an opportunity for trade creation).  
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1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The coffee subsector of Ethiopia has been and continues to be the foundation for the country’s 
agricultural and economic development.  The importance of the subsector in the country and the world 
market cannot be overemphasized. For instance, the subsector accounts not only for over 35% of 
agricultural foreign exchange earnings and about 4% of agricultural Gross Domestic Product (Agric. 
GDP), it also provides income to over 15 million people in the country (Ministry of Trade, 2012) 
through provision of jobs for farmers, local traders, processors, transporters, exporters and bankers. 
Through various taxes levied on the crop, it also serves as an important source of government revenue 
(ICO/CFC, 2000). In addition to these, coffee green exports from Ethiopia accounted for 
approximately 3.31% in value of world coffee green exports between the years 2001 and 2010.  
Ethiopia stands in respect not only as the origin of Coffea arabica (Arabica coffee), an 
important producer and exporter, but it is also the highest consumer of the crop (variety) in Africa. By 
virtue of the importance of the crop in diets and culture of the populace, contribution to poverty 
reduction and importance in earning of foreign exchange, several policy measures under different 
regimes have been devised and implemented on both Marxist and non-Marxist ideologies towards 
developing the subsector. Each of such measures has contributed in part to the dramatic changes 
undergone by the coffee subsector over the past five decades. Adverse influences from past policy 
measures and changes in global and local prices of coffee have over the past years hindered 
achievement of most poverty reduction and subsector development goals, and worsened conditions of 
most producers and other players in the supply chain, leading mostly to distress sales of assets 
(Oxfam, 2002), default in payment of loans, drifting of farmers from coffee production, and increasing 
unemployment among others. 
In spite of the above, Ethiopia still holds much respect in the global coffee market. As to 
whether she can stand the test of time given anticipated increases in world price of agricultural export 
commodities (including cocoa and coffee) over the next decade (World Bank 2007) and the 
accompanying intensification of competition on the supply-side with emergence of new producers and 
exporters of coffee is yet to be ascertained. To help mitigate any adverse future influences from 
competition on the world coffee market (that could preclude achievement of national development 
goals, including but not limited to income generation and poverty reduction) and ensure effective and 
efficient participation and contribution of the country to world coffee green production and exports, 
there exists a strong case to assess its past and current performance in export of the commodity 
(bearing in mind influences from past policy measures), and to identify and estimate the magnitude 
and effects of key economic determinants on the major strongholds of the subsector namely exports, 
price and production. Many studies have been carried out with the view to informing future policy 
prescriptions, but majority of these have focused on issues related to price transmission (including 
Worako et al, 2008), commercialization of agriculture in coffee growing area (including Gebreselassie 
and Ludi, 2008) and marketing and trading policies (including ICO/CFC, 2000). The aim of this 
current study is to bridge current information gap and in order to provide a springboard for future 
policy prescriptions, we begin with how policies have evolved over the years. 
 
1.2 EVOLUTION OF POLICY ON COFFEE AND GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE 
Policies on coffee in Ethiopia may be looked at under three different forms of government; imperial 
government (until 1974), military rule with Marxist ideological orientation from 1974-1991 and a 
federal (reformist government) governance system from 1991 onwards (ICO/CFC, 2000). 
             Under the imperial government, the marketing structure for coffee was free market-based, 
with the industry been regulated by the National Coffee Board of Ethiopia. During this period, coffee 
was bought by traders at various stages of the supply chain and exported, with relatively minimal 
quantities of the crop been auctioned by traders at voluntary auctions in Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa 
(ICO/CFC, 2000).  The role of National Coffee Board of Ethiopia was limited to regulation of the 
auction process and quality control. The free market-based system lasted until 1974, from whence it 
was replaced by a system with heavy State involvement. 
After the revolution in 1974, the former National Coffee Board of Ethiopia was replaced by 
the Ministry of Coffee and Tea Development (MCTD), and coffee production and marketing became 
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heavily controlled by the state. In as much as private traders were still given permit to engage in 
purchases of the crop, much purchase was handled by the state-owned Ethiopian Coffee Marketing 
Corporation (ECMC), established in 1977. Activities of private traders were constrained by licensing 
requirements, fees and taxes. The ECMC, was reportedly responsible for handling 90% of supplies 
(ICO/CFC, 2000), and producers had limited flexibility in terms of the time and price for selling their 
produce (as prices were fixed). Under this regime, Ethiopian agricultural policy was centrally planned 
and controlled by a system of quotas and price fixing. All coffee, handled either by the ECMC or 
private traders had to go to auction where the price fixing and quota system apportioned ECMC with 
all the washed coffee, and the largest quota for unwashed coffee, thereby limiting competition between 
private and public buyers. During this period, grower prices were set by the MCTD, with the 
difference between the grower price and export (f.o.b) price less marketing costs taken by the 
government. With the less competitive marketing environment of the country and decline in world 
prices (during this period) following the collapse of the International Coffee Agreement quotas, a 
drastic decline in production and exports from the country was experienced. In spite of the dark image 
portrayed about this regime, it did place much emphasis on quality of Ethiopian coffee exports than 
the preceding regime precisely because both washed and unwashed coffees were subject to a number 
of inspections and quality controls throughout the marketing chain.  
Control of the State over coffee production and marketing was once again minimized through 
partial liberalization of internal marketing in 1993. Since 1991, there has been a transformation from a 
centrally planned economy to a market-oriented economy. This was a result of the replacement of the 
military government (Dirge regime) by a democratic regime, thereby bringing all Marxist economic 
policies and ideas to a halt. Liberalization of the coffee subsector was purposed on promoting 
production and reducing incidence of smuggling through the increase in grower prices. In contrast to 
the fixed price set under the Dirge regime, payment to farmers in the reform period was determined by 
the market although government continued to set a floor price until 1997 above which prices offered to 
growers at times rose. This reform brought many new exporters and intermediaries into the sector, and 
the proportion of coffee handled internally by private traders was increased to 85% of deliveries at the 
auction while the number of licensed private exporters also increased from 14 to 240 (with 
approximately 75 being active by the year 1999), (ICO/CFC, 2000).  
Following initiation of the reform in 1991, the ECMC was split into two public enterprises 
namely the Ethiopian Coffee Purchase and Sales Enterprise (ECPSE) and the Ethiopian Coffee Export 
Enterprise (ECEE). The ECPSE purchases coffee internally and delivers it to the auction, and the 
ECEE purchases coffee from the auction and exports it. As a means of enhancing competitiveness of 
the subsector, licensing fees have been lowered, the quota system at the auctions has been abolished, 
private traders are allowed to trade in washed coffees, and wholesalers (Akrabies) and exporters are 
allowed to sell coffee domestically at market prices, instead of through parastatals. In addition, 
Cooperative Unions have been given permit to engage in direct sales and export (Dempsey and 
Campbell, undated) since the year 2001. As of the year 2012, more than 120 Ethiopian coffee 
exporters participated in processing and export of coffee to various destinations. Of these export 
companies, 95% were private companies, 5 coffee growing farmers’ cooperative unions and 2 
government enterprises (Ministry of Trade, 2012). 
With increased competition and lower taxation of farm income from sales of coffee, grower 
prices as a proportion of the export price has increased. By figures reported by Anderson and Nelgen 
(2012), farm taxation fell markedly from 42.78% in 1992 to 2.99% in the year 2008. This rate 
compares favourably with that of other major exporting countries like Indonesia (11.09% by 2008) 
and Nicaragua (64.01% by 2008), but above that for Colombia (1.41% by 2008). The reduction in 
farm taxation has contributed greatly to increased coffee green outputs in the country since the year 
2005. Increased private participation also helped raise coffee supply to auction markets from 60,000 
tons in 1991 to 221,000 tons in 2005/2006 (Worako et al, 2008). In spite of these improvements 
however, the post-reform marketing system in Ethiopia is criticized to have resulted in concentration 
of power at the export market, mounting illegal trade across borders, unhealthy competition in the 
primary and auction markets, and high transaction costs (Petit, 2007). 
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Figure 1.0 Nominal Rate of Assistance for Ethiopia (coffee) 
 
Source:  Authors’ construct with data from Anderson and Nelgen (2012) 
 
The reform has also been criticized for contributing to poor quality control in the early years of 
liberalization (ICO/CFC, 2000). Compared to the Dirge (military) regime where much emphasis was 
placed on quality, internal quality control in the initial phases of the reform was left to the market. 
This however is currently being addressed by the Coffee and Tea Authority (CTA) through cupping 
(coffee tasting) before auction, and with auction price closely related to quality. The quality of coffee 
is affected by the production system used, hence the need to throw some light on the coffee production 
systems in Ethiopia. 
 
 
1.3 COFFEE PRODUCTION SYSTEMS IN ETHIOPIA 
With approximately 95% of coffee production in Ethiopia been considered organic, coffee production 
in the country is categorized into four (4) systems namely forest coffee, semi-forest coffee, garden 
coffee and plantation coffee (Ministry of Trade, 2012).  
 Forest Coffee:  
This system of production is found mostly in the South and South-Western Ethiopia, 
specifically in Bale, West Wolega, Metu, Keficho-Shekicho, Bench-Maji and Jimma). These 
areas are regarded as the origin of Coffea arabica (Arabica coffee). Forest coffee is not 
intentionally grown by growers, but is rather self-sown and grows under the shade of natural 
forest trees. This type of coffee offers a wide diversity for selection and breeding so as to have 
plant stock selected for disease resistance, high yields and of good quality in terms of aroma 
and flavour. Production under this system represents 10% of national output. 
 Semi-Forest Coffee:  
Accounting for 35% of national coffee production, this system of production is also found in 
the Southern and South-Western parts of Ethiopia. Trees under this system enjoy relatively 
more sunlight than those under the forest coffee system of production. It involves thinning and 
selection of forest trees by farmers so as to create room for adequate sunlight and at the same 
time ensure adequate shade. 
 Garden coffee: 
This system of production is found mainly in the Southern and Eastern parts of the country 
specifically in South and North Omo, Hararghe, Gedeo, Sidamo, Wolega and Gurage zones. It 
accounts for approximately 50% of national production and is located near residences of 
growers. It is planted at low densities and is mostly fertilized with organic materials.  
 Plantation coffee: 
Accounting for 5% of national production, plantation coffee is grown on state-owned 
plantations (with some currently been privatized) and on well managed smallholder coffee 
farms. Vital agronomic practices like weeding, spacing, fertilizer and herbicide application 
4 
 
(for state-owned plantations), manuring, and shade regulation among others are practiced 
under this system.  
 
1.4 DEVELOPMENTS IN DOMESTIC SUPPLY INDICATORS 
Until the year 2004, coffee production in Ethiopia was driven more by improvements in yield than by 
expansion in area harvested. Area harvested of coffee in the country has over the period 1971-2011 
been directly proportional to world price of the crop, decreasing continuously from 622,000 hectares 
in 1971 to 282,313 hectares in 1991 (a decrease of 54.61%). Production and yield on the contrary, 
increased respectively from 182,200 tonnes in 1971 to 210,000 in 1991(an increase of 15.26%) for 
production and 0.293Mt/ha in 1971 to 0.744Mt/ha in 1991 (an increase of 153.92%) for yield. The 
general decline observed in world price of coffee during the aforementioned periods, coupled with 
high farm taxation and strict farmers’ quota applied prior to the reform in 1991, led to switching of 
most farmers from production of coffee into production of Chat (a stimulant and substitute for coffee 
in Ethiopia). 
Introduction of higher prices through reduction in farm taxation and ending of farmers’ quota 
in the early years of the reform between 1991 and 1993 triggered a return of most farmers into coffee 
production. With liberalization of internal marketing and improvement in production and marketing 
conditions in the country came significant increases in harvested area, yield and production. Harvested 
area increased from 282,313 hectares in 1991 to 498,618 hectares in the year 2011 (19.84% less than 
the value for 1971 but 76.62% over the value for 1991). Production increased from 210,000 tonnes in 
1991 to 370,569 tonnes in 2011 (an increase of 103.61% over the value for 1971 and 76.46% over the 
value for 1991). Yields however, between the two years was almost the same, 0.744 for 1991 and 
0.743 for 2011. Regardless of the stagnation observed in yields for the two periods (1991 and 2011), 
major improvements were observed in productivity between the years 1994 and 2003 when average 
yields were in the range of 0.865Mt/ha for 1999 and 1.03Mt/ha for the year 2003. The highest yield 
(1.10Mt/ha) for the period 1961-2011 was observed however in the year 2007, with the lowest been 
observed in the year 1962 (0.22Mt/ha). Productivity (yield) of coffee in Ethiopia since the year 2004 
has been generally unsatisfactory compared to the preceding decade (1994-2003).  The highest value 
of harvested area (622,000 hectares) was observed in the year 1971 with the lowest (218,343hectares) 
observed in the year 2003. Lowest output (127,400 tonnes) was observed in the year 1961, with the 
highest observed in the year 2011 (370,569 tonnes) 
 
Figure 2.0 Developments in coffee production, harvested area and yields 
 
Source: Authors’ construct with data from FAOSTAT 
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Although the trend in yields of coffee in Ethiopia has been generally positive, there still exists 
room for further improvement as the national average yield (0.743Mt/ha) lags well behind yields in 
other major exporting countries like Vietnam (2.1879Mt/ha), Costa Rica (1.0106Mt/ha), Brazil 
(1.2567Mt/ha), Guatemala (0.9717Mt/ha), and Honduras (1.0659Mt/ha). Furthermore, it is below the 
world average yield for coffee green (0.7907). It is however well above the average for the continent 
(Africa) (0.4719Mt/ha), Kenya (0,2266Mt/ha), Indonesia (0.4903Mt/ha) and Colombia (0.6331Mt/ha). 
All the reported yield figures for the respective countries for the year 2011, shows that with the 
adoption of appropriate technologies, Ethiopia stands a chance of increasing its national average yield 
of coffee, a requirement vital for enhancing competitiveness of the coffee subsector in the country.  
 
 
1.5 DEVELOPMENTS IN EXPORT OF COFFEE GREEN 
Exports of coffee green from Ethiopian have over the past five decades increased from 56,024 tonnes 
in 1961 to 211, 840 tonnes in the year 2010 (an increase of 278.12%). In monetary terms, exports of 
coffee green increased from approximately $38million in 1961 to $677million in 2010 (an increase of 
1681.58%). Most of the improvements in both volume and value of exports were observed after the 
year 2003. Relative stagnation in exports between the years 1961 and 1991 could be attributed to 
inefficiencies in marketing and policy environment under the former regimes and to the volatile nature 
of world price of the commodity. The lowest volume of export (43,858 tonnes) was observed in the 
year 1992, with the highest (211,840 tonnes) observed in the year 2010. In value terms, the highest 
value ($677million) for coffee export was observed in the year 2010, with the lowest ($37,558million) 
recorded in the year 1961. 
 
Figure 3.0 Developments in export of coffee green 
 
Source: Authors’ construct with data from FAOSTAT 
 
1.6 DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION OF COFFEE 
With Ethiopian being not only a major producer and exporter of coffee, but as well the highest 
consumer thereof in Africa, approximately 51% of production was locally consumed in 1961, 64% in 
1985, 62% in 1986, 65% in 1987, 51% in 2007 and 52% in the year 2009. The quantities of production 
consumed domestically were relatively higher prior to the reform in 1991. This could be attributed to 
the relatively lower number of exporters under the former regimes (especially the Dirge regime), 
declines in world price of coffee which decreased incentive for exporters to increase the volume of 
exports thereby making larger volume available on the domestic market for consumption, and to the 
increases in output observed during the pre-reform period. Share of consumption in total production in 
the immediate years following initiation of the reform were relatively lower, decreasing from as high 
as 65% in 1987 to 25% in 2003. It however has taken on an increasing trend since the year 2004. The 
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relatively smaller share of domestic consumption in production in the early years of the reform could 
be attributed to increases in exports observed in the country during that period as a result of increases 
in the number of exporters following the liberalization of internal marketing. 
 
Figure 4.0 Developments in domestic consumption of coffee 
 
Source: Authors’ construct with data from FAOSTAT 
 
 
1.7 DEVELOPMENTS IN PRODUCER PRICE OF COFFEE FOR ETHIOPIA 
Finding up-to-date data on producer price (Birr) for Ethiopia has been an uphill task; therefore the 
current study assessed developments in producer price for the period 1967 to 2005 which was 
available, to provide some basis for inference.  
               Both real and nominal prices for coffee green were highly volatile (fluctuating) over the 
entire period, depicting an increasing trend however from the year 1992 (except for the years 
1996,1997,1998,2002 and 2003 where some declines were observed). The lowest nominal producer 
price of coffee per tonne (1040 Birr) was observed in the year 1969, with the highest (12,467 Birr) 
recorded in the year 2005. The nominal prices for growers were relatively higher in the post-reform 
period ranging between 1,670 Birr for the year 1992 and 12,467 Birr for 2005, compared to the pre-
reform range of 1040Birr for the year 1969 and 4224 Birr for 1989.  
 
Figure 5.0 Real and nominal producer prices for coffee green in Ethiopia 
 
Source: Authors’ construct with data from FAOSTAT 
 
In real terms however, the highest price (18,913 Birr) was observed in the year 1977, with the lowest 
(2808 Birr) recorded in the year 1992. The real prices in contrast to the nominal prices, were relatively 
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higher in the pre-reform period, and declined continuously from as high as 18,913Birr in the year 1977 
to 2808 Birr in the year 1992, depicting a general increasing trend thereafter.  
 
1.8 COFFEE SUPPLY CHAIN OF ETHIOPIA 
The supply of coffee for Ethiopia is characterized by a long-chain with several intermediaries. Primary 
suppliers of the coffee berries are of two forms namely, small-holder coffee farmers (who actually 
grow coffee in gardens close to their residences or in mini-plantations) and collectors of forest and 
semi-forest coffee. In considering the two forms of primary suppliers, the small-holder farmers make 
use of vital inputs of production like land and labour although coffee production in Ethiopia is 
generally a low input activity. On turning bright red on the trees, coffee berries are picked by farmers 
and collectors of the forest and semi-forest coffee. Most of the growers who are affiliated to coffee 
cooperatives send the picked berries to the cooperative organization for washing or sun-drying and de-
pulping. Figure 6 is a summary of the supply chain of coffee in Ethiopia. 
 
Figure 6.0 Coffee supply chain of Ethiopia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ construct 
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Farmers who reside in distant villages far from pulpery or any cooperative organization mostly 
sundry the beans themselves, remove the husks, and transport them to the primary market centres. 
Collectors of forest and semi-forest coffee also take their sundried beans to the primary market 
centres. In the primary market centres, the sun-dried beans are sold to the licensed collectors 
(Sebsabys), who in turn are required to sell the sundried beans to the wholesalers (Akrabies) or the 
Ethiopian Coffee Purchase and Sales Enterprise (ECPSE) wing of the former Ethiopian Coffee 
Marketing Corporation (ECMC). Sebsabys are permitted to buy from farmers but can only sell to 
Akrabies or the ESPE, and cannot take coffee directly to the auction because Akrabies, Sebsabys and 
exporters have separate and different licenses. Akrabies are permitted to buy coffee from Sebsabys 
(but not from farmers) and deliver it to the processing centres and to the auction thereafter, but not 
export it. Exporters are only permitted to buy coffee from the auction and not from Sebsabys or 
farmers (ICO/CFC, 2000).  
Sebsabys  have a monopoly on primary marketing of sub-dried coffee in the private sector 
(except for the production handled by cooperatives) since producers are not permitted to deliver 
unwashed coffee directly to Akrabies. After the preliminary activities of washing and de-pulping 
berries brought to them by their members, the cooperative organizations send the washed coffee to 
Cooperative Unions, who together with the Akrabies or the ESPE have right to send the beans to 
processing  centres from whence they are delivered to the central auction markets in Addis Ababa and 
Dire Dawa. Since the year 2001, Cooperative Unions have been given permit by the government to 
engage in direct sales without necessarily involving parastatals; unions with sufficient capital export 
directly without necessarily getting their produce to the auction markets (Dempsey and Campbell, 
undated). Such actions however have quality implications in the long run. At the auction markets, 
exporters purchase coffee, process it to export standard and then export it to destinations abroad. Some 
of the processed product are however sold to local wholesalers and retailers and then to consumers 
from there. As of the year 2010/2011, 32.61% of processed coffee from Ethiopia was exported to 
Germany, 11.43% to the United States of America, and 11.38% to Saudi Arabia. Belgium, Italy, 
France and Sweden were as well major destinations for Ethiopian coffee exports. 
 
Table 1:   Value of export by destinations for 2010/2011 
No Country Value ($) %Share 
1 Germany 274,430,356 32.61 
2 United States of America 96,229,081 11.43 
3 Saudi Arabia 95,789,714 11.38 
4 Belgium 65,709,947 7.81 
5 Italy  56,316,894 6.69 
6 France 42,903,597 5.10 
7 Sweden 40,234,422 4.78 
8 Japan 34,235,899 4.07 
9 United Kingdom 25,327,211 3.01 
10 Sudan 16,408,741 1.95 
11 Korea, Republic 11,275,767 1.34 
12 Australia 10,506,457 1.25 
13 Canada 8,036,546 0.95 
14 Spain 7,511,057 0.89 
15 Russia 7,377,043 0.88 
 Sub Total 792,292,732 94.14 
 Other 38 countries 49,354,143 5.86 
 All countries 841,646,875 100 
Source: Ministry of Trade, 2012 
 
In the international market, the imported product is distributed to wholesalers (large 
supermarkets), to retailers and then to consumers. A report by the European Commission (2011) has 
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shown that Ethiopia’s Specialty Coffees (Sidamo, Yirgacheffee and Harar) are sold from US$5-9 per 
kg f.o.b. whereas the retail market price of these Specialties is above US$ 50 per kg. The share of the 
small scale producer has also been revealed to be on average 2.8% of the retail price 
 
Figure 7.0 Value distribution of Ethiopian Specialty Coffee 
 
Source: European Commission (EC), 2011 
 
Although a major exporter of coffee, data sourced from the agricultural production database of the 
FAO indicates that in the years 2006 and 2008 , Ethiopia imported respectively 40,928tonnes and 
27,103 tonnes of coffee green  at values of approximately $88million and $85m. This implies that 
Ethiopia engages not only in inter-commodity trade, but also in intra-commodity trade. Nonetheless, 
the country remains a major net exporter of coffee given that its meagre imports are even irregular. 
 
1.9 GLOBAL EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF COFFEE 
Global exports of coffee green increased from approximately 5.922 million tonnes in the year 2006 to 
6.581 million tonnes in 2010 (representing an increase of 11.13%). Over the period 2006-2010, a total 
of 51.37% of world exports of coffee green were from the Americas, 29.59% from Asia and Oceania, 
10.44% from Africa and 8.58% from Europe. At the country level, Brazil accounted for 25.42% of 
global coffee green exports during the aforementioned period, Vietnam 18.08%, Colombia 8.66%, 
Indonesia 6.85%, Guatemala 3.63%, Peru 3.40%, Honduras 3.16%, Ethiopia 2.76% and India 2.54%. 
Mexico, Costa Rica and Nicaragua jointly accounted for 4.73% of world coffee green exports between 
the years 2006 and 2011. 
 
Table 2:      World exports of coffee green 
Country/Region  2005/06      2006/07    2007/08       2008/09       2009/10 5-year average 
2005/06-2009/10 
 (thousand tonnes) Share 
World Total 
Total Americas 
Total Asia &Oceania  
Total Africa 
Total Europe  
 
5922             6158             6346         6305           6581  
3123             3197             3292         3167           3306    
1712             1825             1812        1937           1980   
 656               690               640           611            675     
 431               445               602           589            619                                 
6262 
3217 
1853 
 654 
537
100% 
51.37% 
29.59% 
10.44% 
8.58% 
 
Brazil              
Vietnam                 
Colombia                   
Indonesia               
Guatemala 
 
1476 
981 
600 
412 
204 
 
1488 
1232 
637 
321 
231 
 
1567 
1061 
603 
468 
230 
 
1639 
1168 
458 
510 
234 
 
1791 
1218 
410 
433 
235 
 
1592 
1132 
542 
429 
227 
 
25.42% 
18.08% 
8.66% 
6.85% 
3.63% 
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Peru 
Honduras 
Ethiopia  
India 
Mexico 
Costa Rica 
Nicaragua 
238 
172 
188 
188 
124 
96 
83 
174 
207 
158 
153 
135 
91 
73 
225 
199 
179 
150 
109 
110 
91 
197 
199 
130 
126 
129 
78 
80 
230 
215 
212 
178 
103 
74 
102 
213 
198 
173 
159 
120 
90 
86 
3.40% 
3.16% 
2.76% 
2.54% 
1.92% 
1.44% 
1.37% 
Source: Authors’ computation with data from FAOSTAT 
 
As may be seen from table 3, Europe accounted for 55.37% of total coffee green imports 
between the years 2006 and 2011, when world imports increased from approximately 5.743 million 
tonnes to 6.249million tonnes (representing an increase of 8.81%). During this period, the Americas 
accounted for 25.35% of global coffee green imports, Asia and Oceania 15.06% and Africa 4.20%. At 
the country level, most of such imports were into the United States of America (21.46%), Germany 
(17.41%), Italy (7.54%), Japan (6.69%), Belgium (4.69%), France (4.02%) and the United Kingdom 
(2.07%). The Netherlands, Finland and Austria jointly account for 3.69% of global imports between 
the years 2006 and 2011. 
 
Table 3:        World imports of coffee green 
Country/Region  2005/06      2006/07    2007/08       2008/09       2009/10 5-year average 
2005/06-2009/10 
 (thousand tonnes) Share 
World Total 
Total Europe 
Total Americas 
Total Asia &Oceania  
Total Africa 
 
5743              5904          6047          6036          6249 
3163              3242          3355          3359          3481 
1496              1516          1528          1498          1564 
831                912            868            921             984 
254                234            296            258             220 
5996 
3320 
1520 
903 
252 
100% 
55.37 
25.35 
15.06 
4.20 
 
USA            
Germany              
Italy                  
Japan              
Belgium 
France 
United Kingdom 
Netherlands 
Finland 
Austria 
 
1276 
1001 
424 
423 
222 
223 
118 
146 
65 
66 
 
1313 
1022 
452 
390 
193 
245 
117 
153 
67 
69 
 
1311 
1055 
457 
388 
363 
223 
121 
65 
71 
65 
 
1256 
1053 
457 
391 
314 
254 
128 
72 
67 
27 
 
 1280 
1090 
469 
411 
312 
262 
138 
74 
66 
32 
 
1287 
1044 
452 
401 
281 
241 
124 
102 
67 
52 
 
21.46% 
17.41% 
7.54% 
6.69% 
4.69% 
4.02% 
2.07% 
1.70% 
1.12% 
0.87 
Source: Authors computation with data from FAOSTAT 
 
 
2.1 MODEL SPECIFICATION AND DATA 
The current study analyzes the performance of Ethiopia in export of coffee green (for the period 1961-
2010) and estimates the magnitude and effects of key economic determinants of coffee exports, 
producer price and production (for the period 1981-2005). Data used in the current study were sourced 
from the agricultural production database of the FAO (FAOSTAT), the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI). In the 
following sessions, several indices and models for determining and assessing the performance of 
Ethiopia in coffee trade have been discussed; but first of all, why do countries engage in trade in the 
first place? 
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2.2 COMPETITIVENESS 
Trade theory suggests that countries do engage in trade in order to take advantage of differences 
among them in terms of factor endowments and technology and that the competitiveness of a country 
for a specific commodity is based on the concept of comparative advantage. Several trade measures 
have been used in past studies for measuring a country’s competitiveness in a commodity. Among 
such are the Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) (Balassa, 1965), Relative Import Advantage 
and Relative Trade Advantage (Vollrath, 1991), the Revealed Symmetric Comparative Advantage (as 
index of competitiveness) (Nwachuku et al, 2010) and the Net Export Index (NEI) (Banterle and 
Carraresi, 2007). In this study however, the competitiveness of Ethiopia in its export of coffee green is 
analyzed using the Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) and the Revealed Symmetric 
Comparative Advantage. 
 
 Revealed Comparative Advantage, RCA 
Bearing the same meaning as the revealed export advantage, the RCA measure calculates the ratio of a 
country’s export share of a commodity in the international market to the country’s export share of all 
other commodities. In the current study, RCA is defined as follows: 
 
RCAij  = (Xij/Xit) / (Xjw/Xtw)  
 
Where Xij is the value of Ethiopia’s exports of coffee green; Xit is the total value of agricultural 
exports of Ethiopia; Xjw is the value of world exports of coffee green ; and Xtw is the total value of 
world agricultural exports 
 
 Revealed Symmetric Comparative Advantage (RSCA) 
The Revealed Symmetric Comparative Advantage measure reflects the RCA in its symmetric form as 
an index of competitiveness. It is computed as follows: 
 
RSCA = (RCA-1 / RCA+1) 
 
and it ranges from -1 to +1. The closer the value is to +1, the higher the competitiveness of a country 
in the commodity of interest. The analysis is focused on three distinct periods namely 1961-1973 (era 
of the semi-feudal imperial government), 1974-1991 (era of the Military rule with Marxist ideological 
orientation), and from 1992-2010 (era of the federal government–period of reform and liberalization of 
internal marketing). 
 
2.3 DETERMINANTS OF COFFEE EXPORTS, PRODUCER PRICE AND PRODUCTION 
In estimating the magnitude and effects of key economic determinants of exports, producer price and 
production for Ethiopia, three models were specified and estimated with the OLS estimator after 
verification of data on the respective series through the Phillips-Perron unit root test. 
 
Equation 1: Determinants of coffee green exports 
ln EXt = β0 + β1 ln PROt-1+ β2 ln PPRt-1+ β3 ln (WCPt-1 /PPRt-1)+ β4 NRAt + β5 ln CONSt + β6 ln EXRt-1  
                  +β7 FDIt + ut 
A priori exp: PROt-1>0; PPRt-1>0; (WCPt-1 / PPRt-1)< > 0; NRAt< > 0; FDIt> 0; EXRt-1 >0; CONSt < 0 
 
Equation 2: Determinants of domestic producer price of coffee  
ln PPRt = β0 + β1 ln PPRt-1 + β2 ln WCPt + β3 ln NRAt + β4 CONSt-1 + β5 ln EXt-1 + β6 ln EXRt  
                     + β7ln CPDt + ut 
Apriori exp: PPRt-1>0; WCPt >0; NRAt > 0; CONSt-1> 0; EXt-1 >0; EXRt > 0; PROt <0 
 
Equation 3: Determinants of coffee green production 
ln PROt = β0 + β1 ln YLDt + β2 ln PPRt-1 + β3 ln (WCPt-1 / PPRt-1)+ β4 NRAt + β5 ln RSCA1   
                    + β6 ln ALFt-2 +ut 
A priori exp: YLDt>0; PPRt-1>0; (WCPt-1 / PPRt-1) < > 0; NRAt > 0; FDI> 0; RSCAt >0; ALF>0 
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Where  EXt         - quantity of coffee green export (tonnes) 
           PROt        - Coffee green production (tonnes) 
           PPRt        -  domestic producer price of coffee green (LCU) 
(WCPt /PPRt  )    -Wolrd price (Brazilian Natural) to domestic producer price ratio of coffee green 
          NRAt          - Nominal rate of assistance (%) 
          CONSt     - Domestic consumption of coffee (tonnes)         
          EXRt          - Exchange rate (Ethiopian Birr/ US$) 
           FDIt  -  foreign direct investment (US$ millions at current prices and current exchange rates) 
          YLDt       -Yield of coffee green (Mt/ha) 
           RSCAt    - Revealed Symmetric Comparative Advantage (index of competitiveness) 
          ALFt       - Agricultural labour force (“000” persons) 
           β0           -  Intercept term 
           βi            - Coefficients/elasticities 
           ut            - Stochastic error term assumed to be iidN(0Σ) 
 
3.1 RESULTS 
This section is dived into two parts: 
- The first focuses on analyzing Ethiopia’s performance in export of coffee green under the 
three past and present regimes (semi-feudal imperial government, the Dirge/military 
regime, and the federal government).   
- The second part focuses on estimating the magnitude and effects of the specified 
determinants of coffee exports, producer price and production  
 
3.2  COMPETITIVENESS OF ETHIOPIA’S COFFEE GREEN EXPORTS 
Results of both Revealed Comparative Advantage and Revealed Symmetric Comparative Advantage 
show that Ethiopia has comparative advantage in export of coffee green. Its performance in export of 
the crop was lowest under the imperial regime (1961-1973) and generally unsatisfactory for the entire 
period (1961-2010). 
Characterized by a free market system where traders bought and directly exported coffee 
beans at any time along the supply chain, the local coffee industry under the imperial regime lacked a 
well-developed market structure and had quality problems with the beans exported from the country 
due to the minimum emphasis placed on quality under this regime. Growth in production of coffee 
during this era was as well hampered by low yields. These factors hindered any improvement in the 
performance of the country in coffee exports and at the latter stage of the regime, led to a decline in 
the country’s performance between the years 1971 and 1973 when RCA decreased from 12.43 in 1971 
to 8.89 in 1973, with RSCA also decreasing from 0.85 in 1971 to 0.80 in 1973. 
A move from the imperial to the military regime led to a high state involvement in coffee 
marketing. Under the military rule, private traders were constrained in their activities through licensing 
requirements, high fees and taxes levied by the government, and growers were not left out: they were 
heavily taxed. In addition, prices of the produce were fixed by the Ministry of Tea and Coffee 
Development giving no flexibility in terms of time and prices to the growers. These inhibitions in the 
trading environment limited competition on the market, led to drifting of most farmers from coffee 
production into the production of “Chat”, and triggered large scale smuggling into neighbouring 
countries. These responses precluded improvement in the country’s competitiveness in export of 
coffee in the early years of the regime. In addition, the world price of coffee was on a decline for most 
years under this regime, thereby further reducing incentives for most growers and private traders to 
engage in trade under the military regime. The early years under this government system between 
1974 and 1980 saw no major improvements in the country’s performance. Relatively low transaction 
cost in coffee trading under the military government and greater emphasis placed on quality control at 
the latter years (1986-1991) helped improve the country’s performance in exports of coffee, as 
mirrored by increase of the RCA from 12.20 in 1985 to 36.09 in 1991, with the RSCA also increasing 
from 0.85 to 0.95. The military government following the short improvement in export performance 
between 1986 and 1991 was however replaced by the federal (reformist) government in 1991. 
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Table 4:      Coffee export performance of Ethiopia 
 Revealed Comparative Advantage Revealed Symmetric Comparative Adv. 
1961 10.2547 0.8223 
1962 10.7957 0.8305 
1963 10.0866 0.8196 
1964 10.4947 0.8260 
1965 12.9976 0.8571 
1966 11.1479 0.8354 
1967 11.2611 0.8369 
1968 10.9384 0.8325 
1969 11.8454 0.8443 
1970 11.0152 0.8335 
1981 12.4358 0.8511 
1972 10.4240 0.8249 
1973 8.8903 0.7978 
1974 8.1746 0.7820 
1975 10.9211 0.8322 
1976 9.6052 0.8114 
1977 9.7344 08134 
1978 13.1364 0.8585 
1979 12.4600 0.8514 
1980 13.4641 0.8617 
1981 18.8130 0.8991 
1982 16.0095 0.8824 
1983 16.1575 0.8834 
1984 14.5459 0.8714 
1985 13.3722 0.8608 
1986 12.2020 0.8485 
1987 15.4267 0.8783 
1988 19.7187 0.9034 
1989 23.5996 0.9187 
1990 23.3113 0.9177 
1991 36.0883 0.9461 
1992 44.2660 0.9558 
1993 50.1654 0.9609 
1994 27.8761 0.9307 
1995 25.8179 0.9254 
1996 32.1363 0.9396 
1997 26.8850 0.9283 
1998 31.5391 0.9385 
1999 32.9317 0.9411 
2000 36.3618 0.9465 
2001 53.4545 0.9633 
2002 39.8307 0.9510 
2003 37.5205 0.9481 
2004 43.5336 0.9551 
2005 28.5247 0.9323 
2006 29.9219 0.9353 
2007 26,0698 0.9261 
2008 26,6112 0.9276 
2009 18.3463 0.8966 
2010 22.8338 0.9161 
Source: Authors’ computation with data from FAOSTAT 
 
Partial liberalization, reduction in export and farm taxes, abolition of farmer’s quota and 
withdrawal of constraints on trading activities of private traders under the reformist government 
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attracted more exporters and intermediaries into the sector. Most farmers returned into production of 
coffee due to the relatively more favorable environment created under the reformist government, and 
smuggling was minimized due to the price incentive created through reduction in farm taxation. These 
factors boosted the country’s performance in export of coffee in the early years of the reformist regime 
(between 1995 and 2001). During this period, RCA increased from 25.82 in 1995 to 53.45 in 2001, 
with RSCA also increasing from 0.93 in 1995 to 0.96 in 2001. Authorizing Cooperative Unions to 
engage in direct exports and sales without necessarily involving parastatals, and private exporters to 
engage in domestic marketing of coffee at market prices triggered an increase in the number of 
exporters and intermediaries in the supply chain from the year 2001 onwards. This led to an extensive 
supply chain involving numerous actors and processing activities, thereby widening the gap between 
time of purchase of beans from buyers and sales to exporters at the auction.  
Along with this wide gap resulted a challenge with management of price risk due to the highly 
volatile nature of coffee prices. Quality control also became a challenge as interior control of quality 
was no more under the control of exporters as they were in the latter stages of the military regime. 
With minimum state supervision and increased ability of Cooperative Unions to engage in direct 
export, competition became unnecessarily high in both the primary and auction markets. The 
increasing number of actors and processes in the chain also led to increasing transaction costs. These 
resulted in a gradual decline in the country’s export performance from the high RCA value of 53.45 in 
2001 to 22.83 in 2010, with RSCA also decreasing from 0.96 in 2001 to 0.92 in 2010. The 
performance of the country in export of coffee has since the year 2002 taken on a declining trend in 
spite of the increases observed in world price of coffee between the years 2002 and 2007). 
By these changes, it is noted that the performance of the country in export of coffee has under 
the various regimes been generally unsatisfactory. It was hindered by poor market structure, low 
productivity of grower’s fields, and poor quality control under the imperial regime. Under the military 
regime, it was hindered by limited competition on the market, smuggling and drifting of most farmers 
from coffee production into the production of “Chat” due to high taxes on farmers’ incomes, and by 
the collapse in world price of coffee. Under the imperial regime, it is hindered by challenges in 
management of price risk due to the wide gap between time of purchase of beans from growers and 
sales to exporters, quality control problems, unnecessary competition in both primary and auction 
markets due to the numerous players in the extensive supply chain, and by increasing transaction 
costs. 
 
3.3 DETERMINANTS OF COFFEE EXPORT, PRODUCTION AND PRODUCER PRICE 
As a vital step in the data generation process and in choosing the appropriate estimator, the whole set 
of data (with all variables in log except nominal rate of assistance (NRA) and foreign direct 
investment (FDI)) was verified through the Phillips-Perron unit root test. Output of the test shows that 
with the exception of the variable “exchange rate (EXR)”, all the other variables specified in the three 
regression equations are non-stationary at level, but become stationary on first difference at the 1% 
level. The variable “exchange rate (EXR)” was found to be an I(2) variable, implying that it becomes 
stationary on second difference, and is in the current study found stationary at the 1% level. To help 
capture its effects on coffee exports and prices however, the variable EXR was replaced with its first 
difference (∆ ln EXR). Having made all the variables I(1) through this replacement, the respective 
equations were then estimated using the Ordinary Least Squares and tested for appropriate standard 
Gaussian properties. Results of the diagnostic tests on the Gaussian assumptions for the respective 
models indicate that the residual series for the respective models are normally distributed, 
homoscedastic and free from the problem of serial correlations.   
 
Table 5:      Unit root test of variables (trend+ intercept at level, intercept at 1
st
 and 2
nd
 difference) 
 
 Series 
PP-test stat 
 Level 
N-W 
Bandwidth 
PP-test stat 
1
st
 and 2
nd
 Diff.  
N-W 
Bandwidth 
Conclusion on 
Level 
ln  EX -2.204377 1 -4.983489*** 2 I(1) 
ln  PRO -1.972720 0 -4.788677*** 2 I(1) 
ln  CONS -2.129521 0 -3.961341*** 2 I(1) 
15 
 
     NRA -2.467563 1 -5.646206*** 3 I(1) 
ln  EXR -1.868880 2 -6.641161*** 7 I(2) 
ln  PPR -2.390771 3 -4.520276*** 8 I(1) 
     FDI -2.950608 5 -6.646939*** 22 I(1) 
ln  ALF -2.248686 0 -4.874804*** 2 I(1) 
ln  YLD -0.650916 2 -4.649091*** 2 I(1) 
ln  RSCA -1.907906 1 -3.946510*** 1 I(1) 
ln  WCP -2.306167 1 -4.578313*** 0 I(1) 
ln  (WCPt/DPPCt) -2.911759 0 -6.399812*** 4 I(1) 
Critical value (5%) -3.612199 First difference   -2.998064   
 Second difference   -3.004861   
 
3.3.1  Determinants of coffee exports (EX) 
The volume of coffee exported from Ethiopia is found to be significantly dependent on lagged 
domestic producer price, lagged world price (Brazilian Natural) to domestic producer price ratio, 
nominal rate of assistance, domestic consumption of coffee, foreign direct investment, and on lagged 
exchange rate. The intercept term had a positive coefficient significant at the 1% level, indicating that 
should all the other variables remain constant, Ethiopia will continue to export significant volumes of 
coffee green unto the international market. 
 
Table 6: Determinants of coffee exports for Ethiopia 
 
  Variables                       coefficients          standard error               t-statistic 
 
   Intercept                       15.74279             4.647095                     3.387663*** 
   ln PPRt-1                        0.634617             0.184336                     3.442723*** 
   ln (WCPt-1 /PPRt-1)         0.570133             0.192530                     2.961267*** 
       NRAt                        1.241461             0.658359                     1.885691* 
   ln CONSt                     -0.658376             0.261957                     -2.513301**  
   ln FDIt                          0.001033             0.000441                     2.341297** 
∆ ln EXRt-1                      1.120736             0.444415                     2.521826** 
   ln PROt-1                       0.007101             0.358721                     0.019796 
  Adj. R
2
                          0.636234          Mean dependent var        11.42490    
  F-statistic                      6.496930          S.D dependent var           0.340907 
  Prob. (F-statistic)          0.001209          S.E of regression             0.205611 
  Log likelihood              8.660724          Sum-squared resid           0.634138 
  Durbin-Watson stat       2.145649          Jarque-Bera                     1.772691 (0.412159)      
  Akaike info criterion    -0.057454          B-G LM Test (1,2): 0.338(0.57); 1.668(0.227)   
  Hannan-Quinn criter.    0.041876          ARCH Test,   F-stat:         0.057 (0.8124)                
  Schwarz criterion          0.337500          Q-stat(1,2): 0.257 (0.612); 2.125 (0.346) 
 ADF Test of Residual   -4.998177***     
 
Lagged domestic producer price has a coefficient of 0.635, significant at the 1% level. This 
implies that export of coffee green in time t increases by 0.635% for a unit increase in domestic 
producer price in time t-1. With coffee production in Ethiopia being a low input activity (use is made 
mostly only of land, seed and labour), increases in producer price would help increase output through 
employment of more hands at harvest to ensure timely picking of adequate amount of berries and to 
expand current area under production (with accumulation of enough funds). More importantly, prices 
offered producers by buyers influence their decision on selling of the produce either on the domestic 
market or smuggling it into neighbouring countries for better prices. With smuggling having been 
identified as a major problem in the Ethiopian coffee industry by previous researchers (including Petit 
(2007), AMPD (2006), and ICO/CFC (2000)), increasing producer price could help minimize 
incidence of smuggling, thereby making more coffee beans available for processing and export. 
16 
 
A unit increase in lagged world price to producer price ratio of coffee green leads to an 
increase of 0.570% in exports of coffee green, significant at the 1% level. A priori, the effect of an 
increase in this ratio was believed could go either way due to the fact that such increases are possible 
under four different scenarios (Boansi, 2013): 
- Increases in world price, whiles domestic price is held constant 
- Decreases in domestic price, whiles world price is held constant 
- Increases in both, but more in world price than in domestic price 
- Decreases in both, but more in domestic price than in world price 
The positive and significant coefficient observed for the price ratio indicates that in as much as 
exporters would respond positively and significantly to increases in this ratio, any negative response 
on the part of growers (when victimized) is not significant. This reflects a high dependence of farmers 
on the crop for sustenance.  
Nominal rate of assistance (government support to coffee producers reflected by the level of 
farm taxation) has a positive association (1.24) with export of coffee green, significant at the 10% 
level. Increasing government assistance to farmers through this variable reflects in decreasing taxation 
of farm incomes. Knowing they would earn a relatively higher income from sales with reduction in 
farm taxation, both garden coffee and plantation coffee growers, as well as forest and semi-forest 
coffee collectors are given a reason to invest much time and money in their fields and on labour to 
pick larger volumes of berries, thereby increasing supply on the market for both domestic 
consumption and exports. Decreasing farm taxation also helps in minimizing incidence of smuggling 
of coffee into neighbouring countries. 
A unit increase in domestic consumption leads to a decrease of 0.658% in exports of coffee, 
significant at the 5% level. With Ethiopia regarded not only as a major producer and exporter of 
coffee, but also a major consumer in Africa, a unit increase in domestic consumption significantly 
decreases the volume available for both export  and stock (to make up for future deficits). This effect 
of domestic consumption on exports could be mitigated by increasing domestic production at 
equivalent rate or above domestic consumption. Increasing domestic production at such rates does not 
necessarily translate into significant increases in export as export decisions of exporters depend not 
only on such rates but also on other vital local and international factors. This statement is made in 
support of the positive (0.007) yet insignificant coefficient observed for coffee production in the 
current study. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has a coefficient of 0.001, significant at the 5% level. This 
implies that increases in foreign direct investment stimulate growth in export of coffee green. With 
Ethiopia’s coffee production been considered a low input activity, foreign direct investment plays 
quite minimal roles on the input and production side, but on the broader perspective through 
international relations leads to trade creation. Investments in developing countries by foreign investors 
are mostly made in areas (sectors) in which the recipient countries have comparative advantage and 
such advantages are mostly exploited to further develop the areas/sectors (this however holds in cases 
where investments are made with an export-oriented motive as against a tariff jumping motive). 
Increasing foreign direct investment therefore serves as a greater opportunity for Ethiopia to increase 
its exports through benefits from trade creation resulting from such investment.  
Devaluation of the Ethiopian currency through increases in the exchange rate is observed to 
stimulate growth in exports. Depreciation of the Ethiopian Birr against major international currencies 
makes exports cheaper and with such condition comes increased incentive to export larger volumes of 
the export commodity of interest (coffee for the current study). A lagged instead of current exchange 
rate is used in this study due to the auction system for sales of produce to exporters in the country 
under study (Ethiopia). An increase in the exchange rate in year t-1 may stimulate growth in export if 
exporters are able to access enough coffee beans at the auction in that year. Success in accessing and 
exporting enough beans may result in increased profit for them and put the exporters in a better 
position to bid in the auction for higher volumes in the subsequent year. A unit increase in lagged 
exchange rate leads to an increase of 1.121% in Ethiopia’s coffee exports. Of the total variations 
observed in exports of coffee green from Ethiopia, a total of about 63.62% are explained by variables 
specified in the equation on determinants of coffee exports, and the joint effect of these variables is 
significant at the 1% level. 
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3.3.2   Determinants of domestic producer price (PPR) 
Domestic producer price of coffee is found to be significantly dependent on lagged domestic producer 
price, world price, lagged domestic consumption, lagged exports of coffee green, exchange rate, and 
on production of coffee in the current year. In contrast to observation on the intercept for equation 1 
(determinants of coffee exports) however, the coefficient of the intercept for Table 7 is not significant. 
This implies that, without a significant change in any of the other variables, there would be no 
significant change in the domestic producer price of coffee green. 
With buyers (Sebsabys) having no idea of the price they would receive for the coffee they sell 
later to the wholesalers (Akrabies), and by virtue of determination of market prices through a market 
mechanism instead of price fixing, prices received by growers from buyers are usually based on 
previous producer price and on the prevailing world price of coffee. These are the reasons why lagged 
producer price and current world price are used in equation 2 of section 2.3 
 
Table 7: Determinants of producer price for coffee green in Ethiopia 
 
  Variables                 coefficients          standard error               t-statistic 
 
   Intercept                  -6.891082           4.577254                     -1.505505 
   ln PPRt-1                   0.864542           0.162568                     5.318043*** 
   ln WCPt                    0.268188           0.128155                      2.092684* 
       NRAt                    0.699072           0.455635                      1.534283 
   ln CONSt-1                 0.524912           0.211815                      2.478158** 
   ln EXt-1                     0.976232           0.207386                      4.707316*** 
∆ ln EXRt                    3.018723           0.463646                      6.510841*** 
   ln PROt                    -0.834563           0.340560                    -2..450563** 
Adj. R
2
                         0.859564          Mean dependent var     8.371907 
F-statistic                     21.11085          S.D dependent var         0.491458 
Prob. (F-statistic)         0.000001          S.E of regression           0.184173 
Log likelihood             11.41619          Sum-squared resid        0.542714 
Durbin-Watson stat      1.665676         Jarque-Bera                   0.278652 (0.869944)               
Akaike info criterion   -0.284683          B-G LM Test (1, 2): 0.607 (0.448); 0.467 (0.636) 
Hannan-Quinn criter   -0.180503          ARCH Test, F-stat:        0.659 (0.426) 
Schwarz criterion         0.108002          Q-stat (1,2): 0.646 (0.421); 0.987 (0.610) 
ADF Test of Residual -3.910603***     
 
A unit increase in lagged producer price leads to a 0.864% increase in current producer price 
of coffee, significant at the 1% level. A unit increase in world price of coffee green leads to a 0.268% 
increase in domestic producer price of coffee green, significant at the 10% level. The lower 
transmission of price increment in times of increasing world price reflects the extensive nature (many 
intermediaries) of the supply chain for coffee in Ethiopia and the strong effect of transaction cost. A 
unit increase in exchange rate leads to a 3.019% increase in domestic price of coffee, significant at the 
1% level. An increase in exchange rate makes exports cheaper and results in increased demand for 
coffee beans for export. With increase in demand according to the theory of demand and supply, 
comes increase in price. In order to exploit benefits from devaluation of the currency (which signals 
likely increase in demand and higher prices from wholesaler (Akrabies) and exporters) buyers increase 
the price they pay growers by 3.019%. 
       Increases in demand reflected by both lagged domestic consumption and lagged exports have 
significant positive effects on producer price. An increase in lagged domestic consumption signals 
likely increase in conflict between domestic consumption and exports in the current year. To secure 
higher volumes for sales to the Akrabies and later to exporters, buyers increase the price they pay to 
growers by 0.525% and 0.976% respectively for unit increases in lagged domestic consumption and 
lagged export of coffee. Increase in supply ceteris paribus results in a decrease in producer price by 
0.835%, significant at the 5% level. This observation is attributed to the market mechanism used in 
determining prices paid to growers by buyers in the country. In times of good harvest, buyers reduce 
18 
 
the price they pay to growers due to the surplus of berries on the market. The opposite however may 
be observed in times of scarcity to ensure securing sufficient beans from growers. Of the total 
variations observed in producer price of coffee in Ethiopia, a total of about 85.96% are explained by 
variables specified in the equation on determinants of domestic producer price of coffee, and the joint 
effect of all the variables on producer price is highly significant. 
 
3.3.3   Determinants of coffee green production (PRO)  
Production of coffee green is found to be significantly dependent on yield, lagged domestic producer 
price, lagged world price to domestic producer price ratio, nominal rate of assistance, comparative 
advantage of the country in coffee (measured by the RSCA) and two-period lag of agricultural labour 
force. The positive coefficient of the intercept term is found significant at the 1% level, implying that, 
should all the other variables remain constant, Ethiopian coffee growers will continue to produce 
significant amounts of coffee for both domestic consumption and exports. This reflects a high 
dependence of growers on coffee production for sustenance.  
 
Table 8.0 Determinants of coffee production in Ethiopia 
 
  Variables                       coefficients          standard error               t-statistic 
 
   Intercept                       16.39730             1.291731                     12.69405*** 
   ln YLDt                        0.604442             0.061595                     9.813188*** 
   ln PPRt-1                       0.092097             0.042368                     2.173764** 
   ln (WCPt-1 /PPRt-1)        0.088140             0.037033                     2.380039**             
       NRAt                        0.230725             0.121976                     1.891552* 
   ln RSCAt                      1.437157              0.586871                    2.448848** 
   ln ALFt-2                     -0.433864              0.131034                  - 3.311087**             
  Adj. R
2 
                         0.906070          Mean dependent var       12.19712 
  F-statistic                      36.36954          S.D dependent var          0.148245 
  Prob. (F-statistic)          0.000000          S.E of regression            0.045434  
  Log likelihood               42.64216          Sum-squared resid         0.033028        
  Durbin-Watson stat       2.030585          Jarque-Bera                    0.051949 (0.974360)      
  Akaike info criterion   -3.099318           B-G LM Test (1,2): 0.044(0.837); 0.026 (0.975)                  
  Hannan-Quinn criter.   -3.012404          ARCH Test, F-stat:          0.014(0.908)                    
  Schwarz criterion         -2.753733          Q-stat (1,2):  0.0180 (0.893); 0.0282 (0.986) 
 ADF Test of Residual   -4.547153***     
 
 
A unit increase in yield leads to a 0.604% increase in output, significant at the 1% level. 
Increase in output per unit area, reflects increased productivity of farmers’ fields and a likely increase 
in the number of berries per tree. Increase in number of berries per tree (in times of low incidence of 
diseases and pests attack) in times of increased yield would most likely result in increased volume of 
output. But as to whether that increase is significant was initially not known. In the current study 
however, it is found that a unit increase in yield leads to a significant increase in output. Therefore, to 
increase volume of berries supplied for both domestic consumption and export, there would be a need 
to increase yield. Lag domestic producer price has a coefficient of 0.092, significant at the 5% level. 
This implies that for every unit increase in domestic producer price in the previous year, output in the 
subsequent year may increase by 0.092%. Increases in domestic producer price help growers to secure 
more farm hands at time of harvest in the subsequent year to help minimize loss of berries, expand the 
current area under cultivation and to ensure effective control of shocks in the form of diseases and 
pests attack in their fields. 
Lag world price to domestic price ratio has a coefficient of 0.088, significant at the 5% level. 
This implies that for every unit increase in the price ratio, production of coffee may increase by 
0.088%. Under normal circumstances, production would be expected to decrease as farmers are mostly 
victimized in times of increases in this ratio. Their positive response through increase in output in 
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times of increasing world price to domestic price ratio once again affirms the high dependence of 
farmers on production and sales of the crop for sustenance. A decrease in tax levied on farmer’s 
income through increase in nominal rate of assistance stimulates growth in production, significant at 
the 10% level. Decrease in farm taxation means relative increase in revenue for farmers from sales of 
their produce. Increase in revenue for farmers offers them an opportunity to effectively meet any vital 
production cost, most importantly control of diseases and pest. Increasing nominal rate of assistance 
also gives farmers incentives to sell their produce on the domestic market rather than smuggling it into 
neighbouring countries.. As a reflection of better conditions for production and assured market for 
produce, the index of competitiveness (the Relative Symmetric Comparative Advantage) has a 
coefficient of 1.437, significant at the 5% level. This implies that to ensure continuous growth in 
production of coffee, there is a need for Ethiopia to improve on its export performance, which would 
then translate into assured market for produce at relatively fairer price. An improvement in the 
country’s competitiveness as well reflects addressing of inefficiencies in the subsector and mitigation 
of influences that could have significant negative impacts on production.  
In contrast to the initial expectation however, agricultural labour force has a significant 
negative association with production. This reflects inefficient use of labour available in the country. 
Agricultural labour force has more than doubled between the years 1981 and 2010, but not so with the 
low areas of coffee and other cash and food crops harvested in the country. This phenomenon 
subsequently triggered off “a flower pot law” effect (law of diminishing marginal returns). To make 
better use of the increasing agricultural labour force, there is a need for area expansion in agricultural 
production most importantly for the coffee subsector, on which over 15 million people in the country 
depend for sustenance. Of the total variations observed for coffee production in Ethiopia, a total of 
about 90.61% are explained by variables specified in the equation on determinants of coffee 
production, and the joint effect of all the variables on production is highly significant 
 
 
4.0 SYNTHESIS OF RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The current study analyzed the competitiveness of Ethiopia in its exports of coffee green. In addition, 
it estimated the magnitude and effects of key economics determinant of coffee green exports, producer 
price and production. In analyzing competitiveness of the country in its exports of coffee, three 
distinct periods were considered, namely, years before 1974 (1961-73 for the current study - era of the 
imperial regime), 1974-1991 (era of a military rule with Marxist Ideological orientation) and from 
1992 onwards (1992-2010 for the current study - era of a federal government system). The Revealed 
Comparative Advantage (RCA) and Revealed Symmetric Comparative Advantage (RSCA) measures 
of competitiveness were used for the analysis. Figures for the RCA and RSCA showed that Ethiopia 
has comparative advantage in exports of coffee green. Its performance however for the entire period 
(1961-2010) was found to be generally unsatisfactory.  
 Growth in the country’s export performance has been hindered by challenges in management 
of price risk
2
, problems with quality control, high transaction cost due to the extensive supply-chain 
and the numerous actors and processes therein, smuggling and unhealthy competition in both primary 
and auction markets, and by low productivity of growers’ fields. To enhance its competitiveness in the 
coffee market amidst the anticipated increase in supply-side competition in the near future, measures 
should be put in place to address current inefficiencies in the supply chain most importantly with 
management of price risk, quality control, smuggling, and transaction costs. This could be achieved to 
a greater extent by reducing the gap between time of purchase of the berries/beans from buyers and the 
time they are auctioned, setting high quality standards for the beans taken to the auction markets and 
placing keen watch on those that are exported without going to the auction, ensuring payment of fairer 
prices to growers and appropriate transmission in times of increment,  and by putting in place 
measures to reduce the number of intermediaries in the supply chain to help minimize unnecessary 
competition. In addition, appropriate investment should be made in yield-enhancing innovations. 
                                                          
2
 Due to the volatile nature of coffee prices, both domestic and international and the wide gap between time of 
purchase of beans from buyers and sale of it to exporters 
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In considering the determinants of the respective strongholds (exports, producer price and 
production) of the coffee subsector, export of coffee was found to increase significantly with increases 
in lagged domestic producer price, lagged world price to domestic producer price ratio, nominal rate of 
assistance, foreign direct investment and exchange rate. The intercept term had a positive and 
significant coefficient at the 1% level, implying that ceteris paribus, Ethiopia will continue to export 
significant volumes of coffee onto the world coffee market. Export of coffee was found to decrease 
significantly with increases in domestic consumption. The adverse effect of consumption on export 
could be mitigated by increasing production at an equal rate as or above domestic consumption. 
Increasing output to help mitigate this effect does not necessarily translate into significant increases in 
export, as the coefficient of production (0.007) was found to be insignificant. Hence, we conclude that 
exports of coffee from Ethiopia depend much more on other internal and external factors than on 
production. These variables were found to explain about 63.62% of the variations observed in exports 
of coffee from Ethiopia and their joint effect was significant at the 1% level. 
Producer price of coffee was also found to increase significantly with increases in lagged 
producer price, world price of coffee, exchange rate, lagged domestic consumption and lagged export 
of coffee. The intercept term had a negative coefficient, but was insignificant. Thus, without a 
significant change in any of the other variables, there would be no significant change in domestic 
producer price of coffee. Domestic producer price was found to decrease with increases in domestic 
production of coffee.  A total of about 85.96% of the variations observed in domestic producer price of 
coffee green are explained by these variables and their joint effect is highly significant. 
From our study, we also discovered that production of coffee green is directly proportional to 
yield, lagged domestic producer price, lagged world price to domestic price ratio, nominal rate of 
assistance, and to increases in the country’s export performance for coffee (revealed symmetric 
comparative advantage). The intercept term had a positive coefficient, significant at the 1% level. This 
implies that, should all the other variables remain constant, Ethiopia would continue to produce 
significant volumes of coffee for domestic consumption and for export. Contrary to initial expectation 
however, domestic production was found to decrease with increasing availability of agricultural 
labour. This was attributed to a “flower pot law effect” due to the significant increase (doubling) in 
agricultural labour force observed between the years 1981 and 2010, the relatively low development in 
area harvested of coffee compared to the rate for labour force and to the low input use nature of coffee 
production in Ethiopia. To make efficient use of the available labour, there is a need to put in place 
measures to increase current area under cultivation. 
By these estimates, growth in the coffee subsector could be enhanced by putting in place 
measures to help increase productivity of farmers’ fields (yields), ensure continuous government 
support to the sector, increase competitiveness of the sector in terms of export performance and 
through continuous devaluation of the currency (this could however have adverse effect on sectors that 
rely more on imports), payment of fair prices to growers and ensuring appropriate transmission of 
future increments, attracting more export-oriented foreign direct investment and increasing current 
area under cultivation to ensure efficient utilization of the rapidly increasing agricultural labour force. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Table A.1 Nominal Rate of Assistance per country 
Year Brazil Colombia Ethiopia Indonesia Mexico Nicaragua Vietnam 
1980 - 0.4337 - 0.2149 - - 0.0754 - 0.0668 - - 
1981 - 0.4337 - 0.2008 - 0.1511 - 0.0526 - 0.8387 - - 
1982 - 0.4083 - 0.2208 - 0.2643 - 0.0394 - 0.9253 - - 
1983 - 0.5745 - 0.2122 - 0.3542    - 0.13 - 0.9331 - - 
1984 - 0.5316 - 0.2704 - 0.3724 - 0.1344 - 0.9461 - - 
1985 - 0.2655 - 0.2952 - 0.4571 - 0.0873  0.0677 - - 
1986  0.0463 - 0.2370 - 0.2251 - 0.0416 - 0.6808 - - 0.5804 
1987 - 0.4345 - 0.0549 - 0.3418  0.0613 - 0.7029 -   - 0.7355 
1988 - 0.4589 - 0.2837 - 0.4066  0.0115 - 0.8438 - - 0.3619 
1989 - 0.1391 - 0.1028 - 0.2025 - 0.0561 - 0.3265 - - 0.2967 
1990 - 0.1932 - 0.0323 - 0.3154 - 0.0239 - 0.0556 - - 0.3423 
1991 - 0.2329 - 0.0302 - 0.3876  0.0099 - 0.1263 - 0.4408 - 0.2674 
1992  0.1966  0.1665 - 0,4278  0.0050 - 0.2601 - 0.2593   - 0.206 
1993  0.2586 - 0.0461 - 0.3855  0.0016 - 0.2836 - 0.2032 - 0.1154 
1994  0.5302 - 0.3633 -  0.4093 - 0.0185 - 0.4547 - 0.4197 - 0.1231 
1995  0.0279 - 0.2954 - 0.3934 - 0.0151 - 0.5485 - 0.6157 - 0.0982 
1996  0.0461 - 0.1749 - 0.4233  0.0578 - 0.2233 - 0.3687 - 0.0029 
1997  0.1049 - 0.2638 - 0.3905  0.0451 - 0.3167 - 0.5287 - 0.0228 
1998  0.1041 - 0.1943 - 0.3386 - 0.0116 - 0.3245 - 0.5876 - 0.1512 
1999  0.0573 - 0.1435 - 0.2765  0.0386  0.0093 - 0.4252 - 0.0776 
2000  0.0361 - 0.1148 - 0.1456  0.0700 - 0.3526 - 0.3053 - 0.0742 
2001  0.0515    0.1774 - 0.0431  0.0363   - 0.339 - 0.1434 - 0.1614 
2002  0.1932   0.2463   0.0204  0.0117 - 0.2797 - 0.0651    - 0.158 
2003  0.0302   0.0946 - 0.0998  0.0013 - 0.2707 - 0.4406 - 0.0858 
2004  0.0425 - 0.0377 - 0.0721  0.0306 - 0.4499 - 0.1856 - 
2005  0.0250   0.0084 - 0.0326 - 0.2215  0.1135 - 0.7194 - 
2006  0.0356 - 0.0038   - 0.084 - 0.1958 0 - 0.3369 - 
2007  0.0318  0.0075   - 0.035 - 0.1908 0 - 0.7403 - 
2008  0.0014 - 0.0141   - 0.0299 - 0.1109 0 - 0.6401 - 
2009  0.0008  0.1198 0.0680  0.1183 0   - 0.746 - 
Source: Anderson and Nelgen (2012) 
 
 
Table A.2  GLOBAL PERFORMANCE IN COFFEE GREEN EXPORTS  
Year Brazil 
RCA          RSCA 
Colombia 
RCA            RSCA 
Costa Rica 
RCA          RSCA 
Ethiopia 
RCA      RSCA 
Guatemala 
RCA       RSCA 
Honduras 
RCA      RSCA 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
10.53        0.83 
11.27        0.84 
11.47        0.84 
10.86        0.83 
10.57        0.83 
15.07           0.88 
15.21           0.88 
15.78           0.88 
14.90           0.87 
15.45           0.88 
9.97           0.82  
10.45         0.83 
9.85           0.82 
8.38           0.79 
9.40           0.81 
10.25      0.82 
10.80      0.83 
10.09      0.82 
10.49      0.83 
13.00      0.86 
11.50      0.84 
11.52      0.84 
10.62      0.83 
8.58        0.79 
10.77      0.83 
2.69        0.46 
3.22        0.53 
4.05        0.60 
3.93        0.59 
4.00        0.60 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
8.37          0.79 
7.54          0.77 
6.74          0.74 
5.03          0.67 
5.27          0.68 
15.41           0.88 
14.15           0.87 
16.45           0.89 
18.45           0.90 
18.47           0.90 
7.30           0.76 
7.43           0.76 
8.15           0.78 
11.15         0.84 
8.23           0.78 
12.44      0.85  
10.42      0.82 
8.89        0.80 
8.17        0.78 
10.92      0.83 
10.06      0.82 
9.42        0.81 
10.63      0.83 
12.10      0.85 
10.86      0.83 
3.31        0.54 
3.90        0.59 
6.46        0.73 
8.59        0.79 
10.19      0.82 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
4.49          0.64 
5.50          0.69 
5.40          0.69 
5.17          0.68 
4.85          0.66 
19.26           0.90 
17.24           0.89 
17.42           0.89 
16.07           0.88 
14.83           0.87 
10.39         0.82 
9.52           0.81 
9.04           0.80 
8.41           0.79 
9.75           0.81 
18.81      0.90 
16.01      0.88 
16.16      0.88 
14.55      0.87 
13.37      0.86 
10.46      0.83 
11.16      0.84 
10.74      0.83 
8.73        0.79 
9.31        0.81 
8.59        0.79 
7.32        0.76 
7.24        0.76 
6.61        0.74 
6.22        0.72 
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1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
8.61          0.79 
7.11          0.75 
6.43          0.73 
6.37          0.73 
5.32          0.68 
26.26           0.93 
33.18           0.94 
28.13           0.93 
21.01           0.91 
19.82           0.90 
13.96         0.87 
12.12         0.85 
9.00           0.80 
8.86           0.80 
9.47           0.81 
36.09      0.95 
44.27      0.96 
50.17      0.96 
27.88      0.93 
25.82      0.93 
17.89      0.89 
20.19      0.91 
18.79      0.90 
12.02      0.85 
14.90      0.87 
13.05      0.86 
14.78      0.87 
15.37      0.88 
16.10      0.88 
22.63      0.92 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
5.73          0.70 
6.22          0.72 
5.73          0.70 
5.45          0.69 
5.48          0.69 
5.32          0.68 
5.07          0.67 
4.78          0.65 
4.70          0.65 
5.03          0.67 
21.78           0.91 
24.96           0.92 
26.49           0.93 
24.03           0.92 
22.74           0.92 
19.70           0.90 
19.77           0.90 
19.08           0.90 
17.91           0.89 
20.53           0.91 
8.94           0.80 
10.49         0.83 
11.01         0.83 
9.14           0.80 
8.79           0.80 
6.70           0.74 
6.48           0.73 
6.83           0.74 
5.35           0.69 
4.94           0.66 
53.45      0.96 
39.83      0.95 
37.52      0.95 
43.53      0.96 
28.52      0.93 
29.92      0.94 
26.07      0.93 
26.61      0.93 
18.34      0.90 
22.83      0.92 
17.40      0.89 
17.25      0.89 
19.82      0.90 
18.69      0.90 
16.21      0.88 
15.12      0.88 
13.62      0.86 
13.28      0.86 
11.60      0.84 
11.39      0.84 
26.31      0.93 
30.78      0.94 
29.99      0.94 
29.90      0.94 
26.19      0.93 
29.46      0.93 
28.64      0.93 
26.53      0.93 
27.70      0.93 
26.90      0.93 
Source: Authors’ computation with data from FAOSTAT 
NB:   RCA- Revealed Comparative Advantage 
       RSCA- Revealed Symmetric Comparative Advantage 
 
 
Table A.3 GLOBAL PERFORMANCE IN COFFEE GREEN EXPORTS (CONTINUED) 
Year       India 
RCA           RSCA 
    Indonesia 
RCA            RSCA 
     Mexico 
RCA        RSCA 
   Nicaragua 
RCA        RSCA 
    Peru 
RCA      RSCA  
  Vietnam 
RCA      RSCA 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
0.63          - 0.23  
0.47          - 0.36 
0.42          - 0.41  
0.67          - 0.20 
0.64          - 0.22 
0.51           - 0.32 
0.54           - 0.30 
0.86           - 0.08 
1.09             0.04 
1.53             0.21 
2.72        0.46 
2.37        0.41 
1.76        0.27 
2.70        0.46 
1.99        0.33 
5.72        0.70 
3.82        0.58 
3.68        0.57 
3.39        0.54 
3.92        0.59 
2.17      0.37 
2.19      0.37 
2.33      0.40 
2.92      0.49 
3.10      0.51 
0.02      - 0.96 
0.07      - 0.86 
0.08      - 0.86 
0.19      - 0.68 
0.39      - 0.44 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
0.84          - 0.08 
0.88          - 0.06 
1.34            0.14 
1.27            0.12 
1.27            0.12 
2.33             0.40 
3.39             0.54 
2.33             0.40 
2.76             0.47 
3.43             0.55 
2.41        0.41 
2.07        0.35 
3.56        0.56 
4.09        0.61 
5.67        0.70 
4.39        0.63 
3.67        0.57 
4.89        0.66 
4.80        0.66 
5.26        0.68 
4.54      0.64 
5.13      0.67 
5.83      0.71 
3.15      0.52 
3.39      0.54 
0.91      - 0.05 
1.31        0.13 
2.35        0.40 
2.22        0.38 
1.83        0.29 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1.84            0.30 
1.88            0.30 
1.48            0.20 
1.48            0.20 
1.73            0.27 
5.26            0.68 
5.14            0.67 
4.81            0.66 
4.83            0.66 
4.33            0.62 
5.59        0.70 
5.78        0.71 
6.18        0.72 
5.12        0.67 
5.53        0.69 
9.72        0.81 
8.91        0.80 
7.85        0.77 
7.51        0.77 
8.91        0.80 
12.96    0.86 
9.74      0.81 
11.12    0.83 
10.00    0.82 
9.27      0.81 
1.01        0.01 
0.79      - 0.12 
0.63      - 0.23 
0.60      - 0.25 
1.25        0.11 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
2.07            0.35 
2.52            0.43 
2.40            0.41 
3.16            0.52 
2.42            0.42 
5.90            0.71 
4.63            0.64 
5.52            0.69 
5.54            0.69 
3.97            0.60 
5.92        0.71 
5.96        0.71 
4.30        0.62 
3.54        0.56 
4.83        0.66 
8.65        0.79 
17.51      0.89 
12.26      0.85 
11.63      0.84 
15.53      0.88 
16.64    0.89  
15.81    0.88 
11.94     0.85 
14.12     0.87 
18.78     0.90 
6.12        0.72 
7.44        0.76 
7.75        0.77 
9.31        0.81 
12.81      0.86 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2.21            0.38 
2.25            0.38 
2.22            0.38 
1.89            0.31 
1.89            0.31 
1.76            0.28 
1.26            0.12 
1.38            0.16 
1.10            0.05 
1.15            0.07 
3.19            0.52 
3.07            0.51 
3.31            0.54 
2.56            0.44 
3.06            0.51 
2.58            0.44 
2.32            0.40 
2.28            0.39 
2.56            0.44 
1.59            0.23 
2.45        0.42 
2.08        0.35 
1.90        0.31 
1.68        0.25 
1.39        0.16   
1.46        0.19 
1.58        0.22 
1.41        0.17 
1.55        0.22 
1.28        0.12 
20.41      0.91 
16.36      0.88 
20.23      0.91 
21.13      0.91 
14.28      0.87 
24.60      0.92 
14.29      0.87 
15.53      0.88 
15.19      0.88 
15.82      0.88 
21.32     0.91 
21.15     0.91 
19.3       0.90 
21.62     0.91 
15.14     0.88 
17.92     0.89 
13.73     0.86 
15.71     0.88 
15.55     0.88 
16.76     0.89 
14.73      0.87 
13.26      0.86 
18.67      0.90 
16.36      0.88 
13.69      0.86 
17.88      0.89 
21.76      0.91 
17.59      0.89 
15.58      0.88 
10.72      0.83 
Source: Authors’ computation with data from FAOSTAT 
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Table A.4  Share of coffee green exports in total agricultural exports  
 1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010 
Brazil 
Coffee green exports (1000$) 
Total Agricultural exports (1000$) 
Share of coffee green in agric. exports (%) 
 
756,213 
1,363,471 
     55.46 
 
1,554,661 
5,506,883 
      28.23 
 
1,909,404 
8,984,488 
    21.25 
 
1,819,173 
12,477,373 
   14.58 
 
2,735,490 
35,963,225 
    7.61 
Colombia 
Coffee green exports (1000$) 
Total Agricultural exports (1000$) 
Share of coffee green in agric. exports (%) 
 
349,376 
425,735 
82.06 
 
1,153,364 
1,517,970 
75.98 
 
1,721,965 
2,377,168 
72.44 
 
1,569,299 
3,131,459 
50.11 
 
1,336,358 
4,403,401 
30.35 
Ethiopia 
Coffee green exports (1000$) 
Total Agricultural exports (1000$) 
Share of coffee green in agric. exports (%)  
 
58,533 
94,457 
61.97 
 
158,882 
262,382 
60.55 
 
245,541 
362,894 
67.66 
 
245,159 
320,310 
76.54 
 
354,108 
871,318 
40.64 
Indonesia 
Coffee green exports (1000$) 
Total Agricultural exports (1000$) 
Share of coffee green in agric. exports (%) 
 
35,265 
407,165 
8.66 
 
300,652 
1,353,130 
22.22 
 
500,451 
2,483,192 
20.15 
 
475,694 
4,761,069 
9.99 
 
527,667 
14,942,913 
3.53 
Vietnam 
Coffee green exports (1000$) 
Total Agricultural exports (1000$) 
Share of coffee green in agric. exports (%) 
 
937 
42031 
2.23 
 
4,167 
64,821 
6.43 
 
37,543 
320,813 
11.70 
 
379,863 
1,665,048 
22.81 
 
1,139,974 
4,886,225 
23.33 
Guatemala 
Coffee green exports (1000$) 
Total Agricultural exports (1000$) 
Share of coffee green in agric. exports (%) 
 
79,798 
153,789 
51.89 
 
283,148 
590,940 
47.91 
 
374,833 
795,114 
47.14 
 
444,471 
1,215,376 
36.57 
 
464,417 
2,233,914 
20.79 
Honduras 
Coffee green exports (1000$) 
Total Agricultural exports (1000$) 
Share of coffee green in agric. exports (%) 
 
17,668 
98,250 
17.98 
 
108,022 
305,249 
35.39 
 
191,830 
588,053 
32.62 
 
251,166 
532,383 
47.18 
 
383,283 
939,327 
40.80 
Peru 
Coffee green exports (1000$) 
Total Agricultural exports (1000$) 
Share of coffee green in agric. exports (%) 
 
30,742 
179,940 
17.08 
 
107,630 
313,968 
34.28 
 
139,554 
290,140 
48.10 
 
210,176 
544,715 
38.58 
 
420,087 
1,687,920 
22.89 
India 
Coffee green exports (1000$) 
Total Agricultural exports (1000$) 
Share of coffee green in agric. exports (%) 
 
23,149 
640,824 
3.61 
 
118,367 
1,564,595 
7.57 
 
182,513 
2,448,116 
7.46 
 
244,640 
4,415,698 
5.54 
 
251,992 
11,420,725 
2.21 
Mexico 
Coffee green exports (1000$) 
Total Agricultural exports (1000$) 
Share of coffee green in agric. exports (%) 
 
74,019 
624,446 
11.85 
 
284,545 
1,293,411 
22.00 
 
464,511 
2,086,274 
22.27 
 
570,229 
5,261,081 
10.84 
 
274,792 
12,010,188 
2.29 
Nicaragua 
Coffee green exports (1000$) 
Total Agricultural exports (1000$) 
Share of coffee green in agric. exports (%) 
 
21,598 
104,843 
20.60 
 
106,333 
339,649 
31.31 
 
106,099 
273,330 
38.82 
 
94,862 
275,228 
34.47 
 
174,156 
702,514 
24.79 
Costa Rica 
Coffee green exports (1000$) 
Total Agricultural exports (1000$) 
Share of coffee green in agric. exports (%) 
 
52,401 
112,040 
46.77 
 
183,820 
432,666 
42.49 
 
284,035 
687,096 
41.34 
 
305,492 
1,383,471 
22.08 
 
232,853 
2,242,393 
10.38 
World  
Coffee green exports (1000$) 
Total Agricultural exports (1000$) 
Share of coffee green in agric. exports (%) 
 
2,290,036 
41,179,390 
5.56 
 
7,347,556 
135,838,122 
5.41 
 
9,784,229 
248,044,908 
3.94 
 
9,466,732 
404,513,254 
2.34 
 
10,701,555 
732,868,728 
1.46 
Source: Authors’ computation with data from FAOSTAT 
 
 
